HUMAN EVENTS

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News Section *Printed in Two Sections*

GOP: *A new leader arises*.....(page 1)
Shake up at the White House.....(page 2)
UNION POLITICKING: *Decision in Georgia*(page 2)
SUBVERSION: *HUAC under fire*.....(page 3)
SPECIAL: *The wages of "modernism"*.....(page 4)

Man of the Hour: Leadership has returned to Washington: so ran one frequent comment last week, in the wake of some straight-from-the-shoulder talking by Senator Barry Goldwater (R.-Ariz.). Arriving in the Capital after his smashing victory in a state where voting registration is overwhelmingly Democratic, Goldwater minced no words in discussing the GOP and its potential candidates for the Presidency.

The young Arizonan said he thought the Republican party could occupy only one position if it wished to win the 1960 election, and "that is a position to the right." He was reinforced in this statement by his experience in the campaign just ended. He ran on an unequivocally right-wing policy, attacking Walter Reuther and labor's political power, and he feels strongly that this is the only course which can prove productive of success for the Republicans.

"As of this moment," Goldwater says, he supports Nixon for the Presidential nomination. The qualification, it is felt here, is necessary, for it is believed that Goldwater himself has created an enthusiastic national following. If Nixon should equivocate, it would make it much more difficult for Goldwater to support the Vice President. As for Nelson Rockefeller, the Arizonan says he isn't going to buy "a millionaire in a poke." He will not commit himself to any comment on Rockefeller, even as a possible Vice Presidential nominee, "until I find out what kind of a politician" he is going to be.

Goldwater, quite apart from the laurels of his success at the polls, has now become one of the top leaders of the GOP in the Senate. It is regarded as a foregone conclusion that he will assume the chairmanship of the GOP Senatorial Campaign Committee. This group has the mission of helping Senatorial candidates during elections. Additionally, Goldwater will be the ranking Republican member of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee.

There is even talk of naming him Minority Leader, to succeed the retiring Knowland. Dirksen, at present, looms as the most likely candidate; but many of the "liberal" wing are set against him for his bitter speech denouncing Dewey at the 1952 GOP convention in Chicago. An unofficial spot poll of Republican Senators who will be in the 86th Congress suggests that no less than 16 (out of 34) would prefer Goldwater. That line-up is too close for comfort for friends of Dirksen. (Eighteen of these GOP Senators are on the conservative "Roll of Honor," voting 75 per cent or more anti-ADA.)

Other remarks by Goldwater, little reported in the press, drew favorable reaction from the South. Already, Dixie commentators are saying that the South has at last found a Republican who does not want to start Reconstruction days all over again. One reporter asked Goldwater: "How are you . . . to get along with the conservatives in the Democratic party, most of whom are Southerners?" Goldwater retorted: "Well, I've been doing it for six years; it won't be much of a change." And when reporters asked the Arizonan about changing the rules to prevent a filibuster, Goldwater replied: "I want to see that rule stay as it is . . . I believe that the filibuster, or Rule 22, as it now is, is one of the greatest protections to minorities that we have. I would hate to see it changed." Southern Senators know the Arizonan as a firm supporter of states' rights.

And for the economy bloc, Goldwater talked Budget-cutting in words as strong as any from Styles Bridges or Harry Byrd. "I would," he averred, "start down the hill [on appropriations] on agricultural payments. I would stop the $7 billion a year, and start getting down to, let's say, one billion a year. There is $4 billion or $5 billion we could save."

Heard on Capitol Hill: As belated but dispassionate analyses of the election results come into Congress from the hinterland, some significant revision of early estimates becomes necessary. The day after election, the press suggested that Senator John Bricker (R.-Ohio) met defeat because the right-to-work law was also on the ballot. The implication was that union members were turned out to vote against the Senator in the headlined drive against the right to work. Experts now take a contrary view. They say that Bricker probably would have been defeated even if there had been no labor referendum.

The Ohio labor bosses realized that they had made a cardinal mistake in 1950, when they publicly boasted they would defeat Senator Taft, an outburst which aroused conservatives to organize a big turnout for Taft. This year, according to the labor grapevine, the union strategists decided to beat Bricker, but to say nothing about it—except to build up Republican overconfidence by feeding out reports that the Ohio Senator would be an easy winner.

This was long before the conservatives had finally decided to put the right to work on the referendum ballot. The massive organizing campaign led by COPE, meanwhile, had gotten under way, destined to turn out a huge vote. Result: labor's precinct-by-precinct juggernaut (not matched by any comparable GOP effort) flattened the distinguished Senator.

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● Heeding the admonition of Goldwater—"Go Right to Win in '60"—Capitol Hill Republicans critically scan the White House, as a place to begin repairing the ravages of the Modern Republicans. It is felt that the atmosphere at 1600 Pennsylvania is better since Sherman Adams left, and General Wilton Persons looms as the most prominent staff figure. Persons is liked by conservatives on Capitol Hill. Although he is an old Democrat, he is a conservative.

But the critics at the "other end of Pennsylvania Avenue" think that a well-working conservative operation cannot be achieved without further changes. For instance, it is suggested that two key men be replaced: Hagerty, the press chief, and Thomas Stephens, who is in charge of making appointments to see the President. Hagerty not only is associated with the catastrophic Modern Republican strategy, but also, it is recalled, had a poor record in the Presidential years of 1944 and 1948, when he served as press chief to losing GOP candidate Dewey. "Defeat and Dewey" offer sufficient reasons for getting Hagerty out of the White House.

Stephens, like Hagerty, is also a "Dewey man." Capitol Hill blames him for the unedifying incident recently, when Harold Stassen used the White House portico to read Nixon out of the 1960 picture. The fact that he had just talked for an hour with Ike made Stassen's act "news." Washingtonians say that it could not have happened without the cooperation of Stephens, and some believe it was a "put-up" job, designed by Dewey. Obviously, the present Appointments Secretary should be removed.

● Last week, HUMAN EVENTS reported suggestions that GOP National Chairman Meade Alcorn be replaced by one of a number of possibilities—Ray Bliss of Ohio, Wayne Hood of Wisconsin or Bill Spear of Nebraska. Capitol Hill nods with approval, but goes on to add that when a new Chairman is appointed (or even if Alcorn is retained for a while) it ought to be a rule that he be invited to attend Cabinet meetings. In this way, he could participate in the shaping of Administration policy and offer advice, as well as grass-roots reports, useful to the heads of the Executive arm.

Uranium Bust: Early last week, the Atomic Energy Commission announced that it was closing the door on its guarantee to buy all the usable uranium that miners can produce—with consequent serious repercussions on the uranium-mining business.

Over three years ago HUMAN EVENTS called attention to an accurate prophecy by David S. Teeple, who had forecast such a move by AEC in a piece in the *American Mercury* (September, 1955), entitled "The Coming Uranium Bust." The subsidy for uranium extraction dates back to the days of President Truman; at first a useful stimulant to suppliers of the needed material for defense, it was extended long after military requirements were satisfied.

Last week's ukase writes *finis* to another splurge of the "planners" in the Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC was staffed with planners, many of them from the socialistic TVA, followers of New Deal Chairman David Lilienthal; these bureaucrats were egged on by such members of Congress as Albert Gore of Tennessee and Clinton Anderson of New Mexico, partisans of the public-power nostrum. Long before last week's cutoff of the uranium subsidy, uranium was practically "running out of our ears." A glut developed and a drastic decision had to be made to stop overproduction. Many unwary miners and communities dependent on uranium projects will suffer because of the planners' lack of foresight.

Labor Political Power: Despite the labor oligarchy's effort to cover up the tracks of its climb to power, a labor case recently decided by the Georgia State Superior Court reveals incontrovertibly the bosses' blatant misuse of union dues for political purposes, and the revolt of employees against such practices. Six employees of the Southern Railway Company have been suing the company to prevent the use of their dues, collected under compulsory union-shop contracts, for political purposes. (Fifteen railroad unions were the real defendants.) The Georgia Court ruled that the employees could not be forced to join a union when their dues were used for purposes unrelated to collective bargaining—*i. e.*, politics.

Key revelation in the court proceedings was a stipulation of fact, signed by plaintiffs and defendants alike, in which the unions specified that a considerable portion of workers' dues were not used for collective bargaining purposes, but for the promotion of political ideas and candidates.

Their dues, the plaintiffs elaborated, "are and will be used in substantial part by the labor union defendants to support financially candidates for public office whom the petitioners and the class they represent do not wish to support, and to oppose candidates favored by petitioners. . . . "

Resurgent Conservatism: The Conservative party in Britain, the Capital learns, is making vast strides forward from its difficulties of a year ago. British public opinion polls show the Labor party lagging behind; and the authoritative *Intelligence Digest*, published in London (address: Alderbourne Manor, Gerrards Cross, Bucks, England) by Kenneth de Courcy, reports that "whereas a year ago everyone was agreed that the Socialists would get a big majority," the Conservative Government "can win a general election next year."

Intelligence Digest attributes this rise in Conservative fortunes to the principled stands taken by Prime Minister Macmillan and by Lord Hailsham, chairman of the Conservative party organization. Hailsham, the report states, "restated basic Conservative principles in firm and clearly understandable tones." The de Courcy publication concludes that the firmness displayed by these party leaders—particularly in their strong anti-Communist policies in the Middle East—has proved their allegiance to "the principles in which the rank and file of the party . . . want to believe, but which they suspected . . . had been forgotten at the higher political levels."

This experience of the Conservatives in England, the Capital observes, should furnish a salutary example to the Republican party in America.

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Un-American Activities: Parallel with the left-wing vendetta against the FBI (see HUMAN EVENTS for November 24, 1958) is a campaign to knock off the House Committee on Un-American Activities—a perennial object of agitation by the American Communist party. With the flood of ADA-type Democrats elected to Congress last month, some anti-Communists fear that the drive against the Committee this year may gain more than the usual momentum.

They note, for example, the active participation of the American Civil Liberties Union in the attack. The ACLU in Southern California launched a campaign, November 15, to gain 100,000 signatures on a petition urging abolition of the Committee. The drive is aimed at Southern California's delegation to Congress (one of whom, Donald Jackson, is a prominent member of the Committee). This gambit with the Southern California Congressmen, many of whom are staunch conservatives, is not expected to be overwhelmingly successful. It has, however, already drawn a favorable response from one Democratic legislator—Representative James Roosevelt.

One month ago—following in the footsteps of his "soft-on-communism" father—Roosevelt wrote to a national official of the ACLU, advising him that "it is my intention to cooperate in the offering of a resolution to the Democratic caucus and then on the floor of the House to eliminate the Un-American Activities Committee as one of the standing committees of the House of Representatives."

● Meanwhile, California conservatives are mobilizing against this left-wing onslaught. For example, HUMAN EVENTS recently received a copy of a petition sponsored by the Burbank Legislative Study Club, of Burbank, California, petitioning California Congressmen "to take positive action to continue the House Un-American Activities Committee," and urging an investigation of the drive to abolish the Committee.

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Clergy vs. Communism: Washington applauds the vigorous stand taken by a number of anti-Communist clergymen—led by Daniel A. Poling and Norman Vincent Peale—repudiating a study conference of the National Council of Christian Churches, which urged recognition of Red China. The National Council has long been under fire for its leftist tendencies. Current criticism by such prominent men as Poling and Peale, the Capital feels, will serve to underline NCC's leftism more clearly before the eyes of the public.

Additionally, a group of prominent citizens known as the "Council Against Communist Aggression" had words of disapproval for the NCC action asking recognition. The group charged that the recognition plea was "subversive of the moral fiber of all good Christians, and of all freedom-loving people of all other faiths. The statement, moreover, sponsors, in the name of Christian morality, coexistence with a satanic power, which, allied with the godless tyranny of the Kremlin, has destroyed family life, executed more than 15 million opponents of the regime and has reduced the life of 650 million voiceless people to an ant-like existence."

Among the members of the Council Against Communist Aggression: Congressman Alvin Bentley, Eugene Lyons, Morley Cassidy and Paul Jones of the *Philadelphia Bulletin*, the Rev. L. B. Kines, Victor Lasky, Roscoe Pound, Karl Wittfogel, George Schuyler, the Rev. Dennis Comey, Bishop Herbert Welch, James L. McDevitt (of the AFL-CIO).

High Court: A HUMAN EVENTS correspondent in the Midwest sends along an ironic footnote to the current controversy over the Supreme Court, in connection with the rebuke which the Court suffered at the hands of the Chief Justices of the several states (see HUMAN EVENTS for September 1, 1958). Relaying the account of an eyewitness who observed the presentation of the State Chief Justices' criticism to the ABA in Los Angeles, our correspondent says: "The newspapers deliberately, or because their representatives overlooked what to me was big news, printed nothing about the reception of the report . . .

"[the eye-witness] stated that Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Whittaker were present," and that, after the report had been presented, "the entire audience rose and gave prolonged applause, excepting the Supreme Court Justices, but Justices Whittaker and Brennan, seeing the extent of the ovation, also arose and eventually the Chief Justice rose too. It was, however, with hesitation and a puzzled sort of expression on his face."

Erratum: In one-third of the copies of last week's Article Section, "Socialism Makes Nobody Richer," a breakdown in the reproduction process caused a missing decimal point on page 2, column 2. The second paragraph, which in some cases read: "Tennessee paid 74 per cent of all corporation income taxes . . . [in 1934]," should read, instead: " . . . paid .74 per cent . . . " Orders for reprints will be filled immediately with correct copies.

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The Declaration of Independence opens: "When in the course of HUMAN EVENTS . . ."

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RIP: Modern Republicanism

Two Editorials From
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
November 20 and 21, 1958

STRUCK BY THE apparent apathy—or perhaps it was resignation—with which the Republican party's debacle was accepted by those you would expect to be its supporters, we recently posed the question: Does anybody care?

A number of readers have given their answers. Of course they speak in many voices. Yet it seems to us that running through a great many of them is a common theme which can fairly be summed up something like this:

"Yes, we care a great deal about what has happened to the Republican party. We care about the political ideas we want to be represented by the party. We care because the party seems to have lost its sense of purpose. But if Republicans are to be just like Democrats, we can hardly care very much whether this party or that won this election. If the difference is small, where is the rallying post?"

Now, it seems to us that in the reaction of these people—and there are surely more of them than are numbered here——there is some very practical instruction about the last election and some practical lessons for the future.

One of the main arguments of the so-called Modern Republicans has been that in order to win the GOP must not only keep the normal conservative Republican vote but also capture other voters who have previously been voting Democratic. This is very likely true. Certainly for a generation the majority of our voters have normally been Democratic, and so unless some of the independents are wooed away the Republicans will be a minority party.

But then the reasoning goes on: The voter who doesn't like the Democratic-Labor political philosophy is already a captive. He must vote Republican anyway. Hence the right strategy is to disregard him, to "turn liberal" as a way to win over other voters.

There are, we think, not one but two things wrong with this strategy and both of them are reflected in the attitudes of these people who speak [in letters to the *Journal*].

Much has already been written about the dilemma of the conservative voter who finds no appreciable difference between a Republican and a Democratic candidate on the political issues. [Letters to the *Journal*] suggest that this dilemma has indeed had its effect on Republican fortunes; some voters who would have voted Republican have just stayed out of the voting booth.

Yet it still may be, as the Modern Republicans allege, that these are few. Probably most men who are Republican by habit or conservative by choice will, when the election is finally upon them, vote Republican simply to choose between what they think seems the lesser of two evils. So there are some captive votes the Republicans don't have to worry about while they steal thunder from the Democrats.

But let us go outside the voting booth. Suppose that a man who is himself finally going to vote Republican is asked to persuade his neighbor to switch from the Democrats to the Republicans. What then does this man have to sell? How does he explain to his neighbor what the Republican party offers that is different from the Democratic party? How, indeed, can he work up any real enthusiasm for such a selling job?

Here, we think, is the really fatal flaw in the Modern Republican strategy, far more damaging to Republican fortunes than any apathy inside the voting booths. The stay-at-homes undoubtedly cost the GOP a few votes. But the decisive thing is that the lack of a sense of purpose, the "me-tooism," fails to offer the independent voter any inducement whatever to switch from his habitual Democratic ballot. It fails to create any enthusiasm, much less dedication, on the part of those who should be trying to sell other ideas to their friends and neighbors who have been voting Democratic out of habit.

It is obvious that no amount of selling will switch some Democratic-Labor voters away from their allegiance. It may even be that these are so large in number that the GOP task is hopeless. But it ought to be self-evident that nobody can be switched away from one party and to another unless the salesman can show some reason for changing.

In these letter-writers, and in the many like them, are the people whom the Republican party must count on for its salesmen. Plainly few of them have any enthusiasm for the party as it is. They may vote for it; not many are going to get out and sell it. And those who do so will suffer an acute frustration; they feel the party has not armed them with a product they can advertise as different, much less better, than that offered by the Democratic party.

* * *

There still remains the question what, if anything, the Republicans can do to attract more voters. And it seems to us that here, as with any other sales problem, the way to begin is with a look at the customers. There are some voters who can be sold only an extreme-left-wing, or socialist, political program. How many of these there are, we do not know, but they cannot be won over by the Republican party under any circumstances.

There are some voters who, no matter how much their confidence is abused or how much they are disregarded, will vote for the more conservative of the two parties, even where the relative difference is minor. Their number is, plainly, a minority. Nonetheless, they provide a small nucleus for the Republican party.

That leaves the vast majority. They are commonly called the "independent" voters. However, the Republicans can hardly kid themselves; for more than a generation this majority has with only rare exceptions given its allegiance to the Democratic party. So the political sales problem narrows itself down to a question of how these voters are to be persuaded to change a generation's voting habit.

Now it is plain that if a man has been in the habit of voting for one party and is generally satisfied with what he has been getting, then you aren't going to woo him away by promising him the same things.

And it seems plain to us that if even this man has become worried or uneasy or dissatisfied with what he has been getting, you still aren't going to woo him away by promising him more of the same. Why should he switch?

SO THE PROBLEM narrows itself still further. There is one class of voter, and one class only, to whom the Republican party as a practical matter can look for any additional support on election day. It embraces the voter who has been habitually Democratic but who has been made uneasy or otherwise disillusioned by that party's program—and who sees the clear image of an alternative.

There are many such voters. They show up in the public opinion polls where the questions are asked on issues rather than candidates; they impress themselves on such experienced political reporters as Samuel Lubell; in fact, it is a rare man who cannot find some among his neighbors.

These people are disturbed about what Government policies have done to rot the value of their money. They are uneasy about the failure of Government policies to check the untrammeled power of union bosses. They are disillusioned at the failure of such Government policies as foreign aid and interventions all over the world either to win us friends or to strengthen our national security. And the list could be made much longer.

Whether there are enough voters to change the political pattern, we don't pretend to know. But these are the voters the Republicans must win, for there are none others available to it. And the failure of trying to win them with a fuzzy imitation of the Democratic image is written indisputably in the record books.

All that anyone can say is that a Senator Taft, whose record was a clear image, could find them in large numbers. So could a Dwight Eisenhower, when he held up a clear alternative. And so too might the Republican party if it would try, again, to show the people a clear image and a clear alternative.

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Article Section *Printed in Two Sections*

This week will mark the seventeenth anniversary of the bombing of Pearl Harbor—December 7, 1941. In the years that have followed the close of World War II, a growing body of historical writing has disclosed the true causes of this tragic event, and of the series of decisions which placed the Soviet Union in a dominant position on the Eurasian continent. In the interest of adding to this historical record, HUMAN EVENTS here offers a carefully documented account of how the Americans who died at Pearl Harbor were finally betrayed, as the benefits of the bloody Pacific War were handed over to the Communists.

HOW WE LOST THE PACIFIC WAR

The Soviets Reaped the Benefits of US Fighting

By ANTHONY KUBEK
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IN 1941, WHEN JAPAN struck at Pearl Harbor, her economic potential was approximately ten per cent of that of the United States; the acreage of her arable land was no more than three per cent of America's, yet it had to support a population over half as large as our own. Japan depended on Manchuria and Korea for most of her raw materials and large supplies of grain, which had to cross the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea. Because of this, Japan's merchant navy was the center of her economic existence, without which she could not survive.

One of the most decisive naval battles in the Pacific war was fought in Leyte Gulf in October, 1944, resulting in the destruction of the Japanese Navy; except by land-based aircraft, the United States had won undisputed command of the sea. When Admiral Mitsumasa Yoni, Navy Minister of the Koiso cabinet, was questioned on the battle after the war, he realized that the defeat of Leyte "was tantamount to loss of the Philippines." As for the larger significance of the battle, he said, "I felt that that was the end."

This "larger significance" was missed by President Roosevelt and his advisers, who failed to appreciate the political implication of their overwhelming victory. There is no question that the Japanese Navy virtually ceased to exist, and that Japan therefore could not possibly win the war. As she was doomed to lose it, the American problem was predominantly political: namely, how could her defeat be brought about at the highest profit to the United States?

It was a far simpler problem than the one that faced President Roosevelt in Europe, where he had to consider his allies. The war with Japan was 95 per cent an American war, and to win it at the highest profit it was essential, in order to avert complications, that the United States should win it single-handed. Had this been understood, it would have been appreciated that as Russia was the only power that could complicate the issue, it was highly desirable for the United States to bring the war with Japan to an end while Russia was still at grips with Germany.

The Japanese Emperor realized the critical situation facing his country. The evidence in the Tokyo War Criminal Trials reveals that he acted as a peace-maker at the various top-level conferences. He realized that a negotiated peace would at least save his country from total destruction. By late 1944, moreover, it was, or should have been, apparent to American military officials through intelligence that what remained of the Kwantung Army was largely composed of green conscripts and second-rate troops, with virtually no air support, incapable of a prolonged campaign: it had been bled white to provide reinforcement for other fronts. Thus, Lieutenant General Ija Kawabe, commander of the Japanese Air Force in Manchuria from May, 1943, to August, 1944, told interrogators of the Strategic Bombing Survey that "in July or August of 1943 the bulk of [his] planes were moved out of Manchuria. . . . For the last six months I was there, anyhow, the actual planes which could be considered operational were nil, practically none."

THE JAPANESE difficulties were no secret to US officials. Informed opinion among high-ranking military men familiar with the Pacific campaign was, overwhelmingly, that Japan could be beaten without Soviet intervention:

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● In October, 1944, Admiral Leahy considered that the war against Japan "had progressed to the point where her defeat was only a matter of time and attrition. Therefore, we did not need Stalin's help to defeat our enemy in the Pacific. The Army [*i.e.*, General Marshall] did not agree with me. . . ." This was also the opinion of General Arnold, the Chief of Air Staff, whose superfortresses were already bombing Japan from island airfields.

● Admiral King, in command of the United States naval forces in the Far East, was convinced that Japan would be defeated without any invasion of the home islands, but upon Marshall's insistence the Joint Chiefs of Staff went ahead and prepared plans for a landing. Neither King nor Leahy liked the idea; however, as "unanimous decisions were necessary in the Joint Chiefs' meetings" they reluctantly acquiesced, feeling that in the end sea power would accomplish the defeat of Japan, as proved to be the case. This is a clear indication that the Joint Chiefs did not agree unanimously for the invasion of Japan, although there have been repeated statements that they did. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was yet another high-ranking naval officer who believed that Japan could be strangled into submission by blockade.

● Major General Charles A. Willoughby has gone on record as saying that the MacArthur staff held before Yalta that there was not the slightest reason for permitting Russia to sneak in the war at the last moment. "Without Russia, even without the atom bomb, the Japanese were finished," declared Willoughby. "It was only a matter of how soon they would quit." General MacArthur was not consulted in advance of the Yalta Conference on the question of whether Russia should be offered inducements to enter the war against Japan. "Had my views been requested," he said, "I would most emphatically have recommended against bringing the Soviet in the Pacific War at that late date. To have made vital concessions for such a purpose would have seemed to me fantastic."

WHY DID President Roosevelt, in the face of evidence which proved convincing to all these qualified men, make a series of concessions to Stalin to bring the Red Army into the Japanese war? Roosevelt's intimates give two reasons. Admiral Leahy, who was Roosevelt's personal Chief of Staff, says that the President was actuated by the belief that "Soviet participation in the Far East Operation would insure Russia's sincere cooperation in his dream of a united, peaceful world." On the other hand, his Secretary of State, Stettinius, reports that immense pressure was put on the President by our military leaders to bring Russia into the Far Eastern War. He adds that the American Chiefs of Staff had warned Roosevelt that "without Russia it might cost the United States a million casualties to conquer Japan" and that the Pacific War might not end until 1947.

The chief advocate of this view was General George Marshall, who submitted a memorandum to President Roosevelt on January 23, 1945, advising that:

> Russia's entry at as early a date as possible consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations. The US will provide maximum support without interfering with our main effort against Japan.
>
> The objective of Russia's military effort against Japan in the Far East should be the defeat of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, air operations against Japan proper in collaboration with US air forces based in Eastern Siberia, and maximum interference with Japanese sea traffic between Japan and the mainland of China.

Admiral Ellis Zacharias has written that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff persuaded the President to bring the Soviet Union into the war against Japan on a wholly inaccurate and misleading intelligence report. He asserts that at least two other accurate intelligence reports were available, one prepared in the War Department and one prepared by himself, but that both had been pigeonholed somewhere in the Pentagon. Neither of them reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who acted on the basis of an intelligence document which overestimated enemy strength. No one has yet explained how these strange occurrences came to pass.

A group of veteran intelligence officers, most of them regular Army colonels, prepared a document known as the "Colonel's Report," not long before our leaders went to Yalta. From about September, 1944, on, the colonels felt that Japan was beaten. If they had been consulted by the "high level" leaders before Yalta, they would have given the following advice:

> The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war would be a political event of world-shaking importance, the ill effect of which would be felt for decades to come. Its military significance at this stage of the war would be relatively unimportant. Many military experts believe that the US and Great Britain without further help possess the power to force unconditional surrender upon Japan, or to occupy the islands and mainland possessions. It may be expected that Soviet Russia will enter the Asiatic war but at her own good time and probably only when the hard fighting stage is over. The entry of Soviet Russia into the Asiatic war at so late a moment would shorten hostilities but little, and effect only a slight saving of American lives. Strong enough to crush Japan ourselves, the United States should make no political or economic concessions to . . . Soviet Russia to bring about or prevent an action which she is fully determined to take anyway. . . . It should be reiterated that the United States Army is by no means united in believing it wise to encourage the Soviet Union to enter the Asiatic War. . . .

This common-sense analysis was not heeded by the American statesmen who travelled to Yalta

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in February, 1945, to confer with Stalin. As a consequence, there is little doubt that the Yalta meeting marked the greatest diplomatic defeat in American history. With a naval base at Port Arthur, commercial preponderance in Dairen and control over South Manchurian Railway—all handed over to them at Yalta—the Soviets could dominate North China. Control over the Kurile Islands, also bestowed upon Stalin, took away from Japan her great fishing grounds and made her dependent upon Russian favors. At Yalta, comments Patrick J. Hurley, former Ambassador to China, "American diplomats surrendered the territorial integrity and political independence of China, surrendered the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and wrote the blueprint for the Communist conquest of China. . . . "

As its part of the bargain, the Soviet Union agreed to enter the war against Japan three months after the defeat of Germany. Marshal Stalin was insistent, however, that Russia would have to be supplied and stockpiled with American material before any action was taken against the Japanese. All in all, Stalin said, the Russians would need more than one million tons of cargo, and they must be delivered by June 30, 1945. By the time of the Potsdam Conference, United States officials had supplied Russia with enough equipment to make her a major power in the Pacific, and this was done at the expense of our own fighting forces in that part of the globe. General MacArthur protested very bitterly when he received a directive from Washington which at a critical time upset his timetable for the Philippines campaign. Major General Whitney tells the story: ". . . one hundred of his transport ships were to be withdrawn immediately," he said, "to be used to carry munitions and supplies across the North Pacific to the Soviet forces in Vladivostok. . . . Later, of course, they were the basis of Soviet military support of North Korea and Red China."

Helping to delay the Japanese surrender, and thus working to the benefit of the Soviets, was the American policy of "Unconditional Surrender," with all its implications for the fate of the Japanese Emperor. In March of 1945, Colonel Dana Johnson, Army Chief of psychological warfare in the Pacific, flew to Washington to confide to the highest circles his conviction, based on exchanges with ranking prisoners of war, that the Japanese Army was ready to quit if only the Emperor was spared. The Japanese believed, however, that "Unconditional Surrender" could be the equivalent of national extinction.

The Emperor was the godhead of the armed forces, and in the eyes of the people a divinity. Yet there was one thing he could not do, and that was to order his people to surrender unconditionally, and thereby to acquiesce in his becoming a war criminal, to be placed on trial or shot at sight. Interrogations of Japanese prisoners of high rank revealed "that the Japanese were on the point of giving up but held back by fear that the imperial institution would be abolished and the Emperor himself punished as a war criminal."

The day before Christmas, 1944 (two months before the Yalta Conference), US intelligence authorities in Washington received a report from a confidential agent in Japan that a peace party was emerging and that the Koiso cabinet would soon be succeeded by a cabinet headed by Admiral Baron Suzuki, who would initiate surrender proceedings.

The Koiso cabinet was succeeded by a new Government headed by Suzuki in early April, 1945. Admiral Suzuki had instructions from the Emperor to arrange an end to the war, but "Unconditional Surrender" proved a formidable stumbling block. On April 24, 1945, the Joint Chiefs again reviewed the war in the Pacific and said that the "concept of 'Unconditional Surrender' is foreign to the Japanese nature" and that "unless definition of Unconditional Surrender can be given which is acceptable to the Japanese, there is no alternative to annihilation and no prospect that the threat of absolute defeat will bring capitulation."

In the middle of May, Henry Luce, *Time-Life* publisher, reported to Acting Secretary Grew that he was "very much aroused" over his Government's failure to procure the surrender of an enemy already defeated. That failure, Luce advised Grew, was "doing great damage to the morale of the American forces" who were "anticipating the losses that would have to be paid" in a full-scale invasion of the Japanese homeland. Impressed with this testimony, Secretary Grew asked Eugene Dooman, a Far Eastern expert, to prepare a draft of peace proposals to the Japanese. On May 25, 1945, a draft was prepared guaranteeing the Japanese people a Government of their own choice, including, if they so elected, "a constitutional monarchy."

Grew laid the proposal before the State Department policy board, consisting of the assistant secretaries, where it met its first obstacle. The clause respecting the Emperor provoked "a violent reaction" from Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish. Assuming full responsibility, Grew went to the White House and submitted the paper to President Truman in the presence of Judge Samuel I. Rosenman. The President quickly gave his approval, subject only to the endorsement of the military.

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On May 29, the President called a special meeting at the Pentagon. Those present were Secretary Grew, James Forrestal, John McCloy, Elmer Davis, Eugene Dooman and joint staff officers headed by General Marshall. All those present agreed that an announcement should be made to the Japanese explaining our terms for surrender, providing a fair chance it would bring the war to an end. However, General Marshall expressed the opinion that the paper was "premature" and the project was pigeonholed.

Shortly before the Potsdam Conference convened, there were those who felt that the United States could not afford to hold out any clarification of terms to Japan that might be construed as an American desire to end the war before the Soviet Union had the opportunity to enter it. They were opposed by officials who wanted an early peace. Members of this peace party—according to Eugene Dooman—were Under Secretary Grew, President Truman, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy.

In the opposing faction, as disclosed by Dooman, were Dean Acheson, then Assistant Secretary of State, his colleague Archibald MacLeish, Elmer Davis, chief of the OWI, and the Army Chief of Staff, Marshall. Forrestal, Stimson and Grew made persistent efforts to bring about an early peace. As June wore away, a note of urgency entered their deliberations. General Marshall seemed bent upon a frontal attack upon the Japanese homeland without first trying to secure peace.

On June 19, Forrestal noted Stimson's "vigorous" agreement with Grew's contention at a State, War and Navy Conference that terms safeguarding the Emperor's status should be worked out as a means of averting the invasion. On July 6, Secretary Forrestal expressed to Secretary Grew his lively apprehension that the peace overture ". . . would be ditched on the way over [to Potsdam] by people who accompany the President — Bohlen [Charles E. "Chip" Bohlen] among others—who reflect the view that we can not afford to hold out any clarification of terms to Japan which could be construed as a desire to get the Japanese war over before Russia has an opportunity to enter."

The issue of invasion *vs.* peace came to a head at a conference of the President and his military leaders at the White House on the eve of his departure for Potsdam. The military, paced by Marshall, assured the President that the invasion was necessary to obtain Japan's submission. McCloy spoke up for a "political" offensive first, including a hint of the atomic bomb and a promise to preserve the Emperor. The "military leaders were somewhat annoyed at his interference," but the President "welcomed the idea." *The Office of War Information, headed by Elmer Davis, backed up by a certain element in the Department of State, was advising him that the Japanese Emperor system should be abolished. Owen Lattimore even paid a call on the President to convince him of this view.*

Had American officials attempted more heartily to negotiate surrender terms with the Japanese in June of 1945, the American and Chinese, and not the Red Army, would have taken the surrender of the Kwantung Army. That army's huge stores, the Mukden arsenal, the industrial facilities of Manchuria, would not then have been put at the disposal of the Chinese Reds. Without those munitions, or their equivalent from Russian sources, the Reds could scarcely have conquered China.

"The true question," said Secretary Stimson, "was not whether surrender could have been achieved without the use of the [atomic] bomb, but whether a different diplomatic and military course would have led to an earlier surrender. Here the question of intelligence became significant. Interviews after the war indicated clearly that a large element of the Japanese Cabinet was ready in the spring to accept substantially the same terms as those finally agreed on. It is possible, in light of the final surrender, that a clearer and earlier exposition of American willingness to retain the Emperor would have produced an earlier ending of the war; this course was earnestly advocated by Grew and his immediate associates during May, 1945."

A June peace might well have headed off the Communist conquest of China. It would certainly have spared us many lives in the summer of 1945; in all human probability it would likewise have spared us the war in Korea, the loss of which either by diplomacy or military defeat would go far toward assuring the hammer and sickle hegemony over all Asia.

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